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BOOK REVIEW
Hazardous Waste Liability
By Warren Freedman. Michie Company, Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia, 1987. Pp. 845 $85.00 (hardcover, Supp. due 1988).
Warren Freedman of the New York Bar presents a
splendid one volume synthesis of hazardous waste liability
that together with Donald Stever's Law of Chemical Regula-
tion and Hazardous Waste' will form the two pillars of the
environmental practitioner's hazardous waste written
resources.
In his prologue, Freedman aptly recognizes that hazard-
ous waste liability may be considered the inscrutable under-
belly of older tort and statutory remedies. Inscrutable until
recently, that is, when modern revelations of hazards in long-
standing industrial practices, preserved by nonexistent regula-
tion, or quiet circumvention of inadequate regulation, pressed
these concerns into public awareness and alarm.
Early in Hazardous Waste Liability, Freedman provides
helpful definition to his subject matter. Hazardous wastes in-
clude "(a) inorganic compounds containing toxic or heavy
metals; (b) inorganic chemical compounds without toxic or
heavy metals; (c) organic chemicals containing toxic or heavy
metals; (d) organic chemicals without toxic or heavy metals;
(e) biological wastes; (f) flammable wastes; and (g) explosive
wastes."' Because there is frequently a period of long latency
between personal or property exposure to hazardous waste
and the discovery of the resulting injury, and because there
are often extraordinary problems in proving causation, Freed-
1. D. Stever, Law of Chemical Regulation and Hazardous Waste (1987).
2. W. Freedman, Hazardous Waste Liability at 3-4 (1987).
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man delineates hazardous waste disposal as "an environmen-
tal risk that is not immediately controllable." 3
The author approvingly quotes Talbor Page's description
of these environmental risks in terms of ten characteristics:
(1) when the risk is taken, there is inadequate knowledge
of the mechanism by which potential harm may result;
(2) the potential costs of the harm risked are
catastrophic;
(3) the costs are externalized at the time the decision to
take the risk is made;
(4) the benefits of taking the risk are relatively modest;
(5) the benefits are internalized;
(6) the harm risked is collective;
(7) there is a low probability of the harm occurring;
(8) the low probability is likely to be subjectively
underestimated;
(9) the harm risked will not occur for a substantial length
of time after risky action is taken; and
(10) the harm is irreversible."
In a section entitled "The Apparent Failure of Govern-
mental Regulation," Freedman castigates slow and labyrin-
thine state and federal enforcement procedures, laying at the
door of public bodies responsibility for "the alarming result
that years may elapse before the pollution is abated." An im-
perfect but available solution is the private citizen action. In
his chapter devoted to private rights of action,6 Freedman
observes:
[c]ourts have generally been liberal in authorizing indi-
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 2-3. (quoting Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar
Risk, 7 Ecology L. Q. 207, 208-24 (1978)).
5. Id. at 52.
6. Ch. 5, The Role of Private Actions in Protecting Public Interests at 219.
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viduals and organizations representing individuals to
bring private causes of action, where the individuals live
in those areas affected by pollution which constitute the
violations at issue. The organization must, however,
demonstrate that it represents those individuals, or the
court will hold that the organization lacks standing to
sue. . . . [C]orporations showing an injury within their
zone of interest which injury is protected by the statute
have [also] been active plaintiffs.7
The author discusses the salutary effect on citizen stand-
ing to sue of such actions as Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,8
in which the Supreme Court held that the Atomic Energy Act
does not preempt a private punitive damage award arising
from a nuclear facility; and Doralee Estates v. Cities Service
Oil Co., s another affirmance of the imposition of punitive
damages in a private action. Doralee Estates was brought by a
property owner against the landlord of an oil terminal dis-
charging petroleum waste onto the plaintiff's lake and lands in
proximity to a bungalow colony. 10 The author also describes
the public trust analytical underpinnings to the private right
of action,1" and makes reference to the unusual public trust
embodiment in the Louisiana Constitution, which provides
that "natural resources of the state, including air and water,
and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the
environment shall be protected, conserved and replenished in-
sofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety and
welfare of the people." In addition, the Lousiana Constitution
mandates the legislature to enact laws to implement this
policy.1 2
Concerning implication of a private right of action from a
statute, the rule remains that a private right may be implied
in a statute not expressly creating that right where (1) the in-
7. Freedman, supra note 2, at 221 (citations omitted).
8. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
9. 569 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1977).
10. Freedman, supra note 2, at 222.
11. Id. at 227-30.
12. La. Const. art. IX, § 1. See also Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Con-
trol Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
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jured party is a member of a group for whose special benefit
the statute was enacted; (2) the primary purpose of the stat-
ute would be served by inferring a private right of action; (3)
there is evidence of legislative intent to create a private right
of action; and (4) the private right of action is one residing in
what is traditionally an area of state, rather than federal, con-
cern.'" Of course citizen suits weigh in most effectively with
the new generation of environmental laws that expressly pro-
vide for them. Given life in § 304 of the Clean Air Act,"' a
majority of federal environmental statutes now include com-
parable provisions. 15 Freedman discusses the common juris-
dictional and injury-in-fact prerequisites of the principal stat-
utes, and gives an illuminating discussion of the myriad
obstacles, posed by the courts and defendants alike, to the
vindication of plaintiffs' claims.
Later in the volume, the author devotes a chapter to an
in-depth review of these issues and more. In Chapter 11,
"Procedural Issues and Procedural Problems Revisited,"
Freedman provides, in the context of the pertinent decisional
law, a thorough and readable exegis on plaintiff's complaint,
responsive pleadings, the class action, discovery and pre-trial
preparation, bifurcation, removal, jury selection, evidence (in-
cluding expert testimony), and judicial review of agency
action.
In two chapters, titled "Causation: Medical, Scientific
and Legal" and "The Latent Injury, Disease or Death,"
Freedman offers an able analysis of some of the most vexing
issues in environmental, personal injury and property damage
litigation: proof of causation, and proof of perpetrator identifi-
cation. The latter dilemma confronts the attorney whose cli-
13. Freedman, supra note 2, at 231. See Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S.
33 (1916) and Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
15. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982); Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1982); Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1985); Toxic Substances Control Act,
15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1982); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1982); and Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1982).
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ent "has no idea of what product or substance... caused the
injury, disease or death; [and where] the number of manufac-
turers, distributors or generators may be in the
thousands .... 16
Of course, once the causative substance and the instru-
mentality are identified, the plaintiff must still show that the
hazardous substance was the substantial cause of the injury,
disease or property damage. The uneven efficacy of epidemio-
logical evidence is described, together with a section titled
"Reform of Causation Principles. 1 7 Of one proposal for a
sliding scale burden of proof, pursuant to which a plaintiff al-
leging harm from a very risky and minimally beneficial activ-
ity would face a lower burden of proof than would the plain-
tiff claiming comparable harm from a beneficial activity,
Freedman responds: "Such a proposal requires a court to
make an extraordinarily difficult cost-benefit and risk-benefit
decision, and at the same time encourages the plaintiff to
overstate the risk of harm in order to take advantage of a
lower burden of proof."' 8
A review can provide only a glimpse of the author's work,
and, ideally, a vicarious appreciation of sound, practical schol-
arship, well executed and attractively presented. The author,
the publisher, and the practitioner should savor the result.
M. Stuart Madden*
16. Freedman, supra note 2, at 291.
17. Id. at 296-98.
18. Id. at 296.
* M. Stuart Madden, Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law,
B.A. University of Pennsylvania, M.A. London School of Economics, J.D. Georgetown
University Law Center.
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